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notice," since it was known that the insurer had no- knowledge
of the defendant's whereabouts. 19
While the decision in the present case is commendable, -it
indicates that much of the law interpreting the statutory language
of 308(4) is being made by the lower and intermediate courts
of New York., Therefore, unless silence means acceptance, practitioners will have to await an interpretation by the Court of
Appeals to know how far the New York courts may go in
fashioning orders under 308(4).
ARTICLE 10-

PARTIEs GENERALLY

CPLR 1001.: Dismissal for failure to join necessary party.
Where both a husband and wife signed a contract for the
purchase of a home, the supreme court, in Mechta v. Scaretta,20
held that the wife was a necessary party to an action to recover
the down payment and that in her absence the action could not
proceed.
CPLR 1001(a) provides that necessary parties are persons
who might be inequitably affected by a judgment, or persons
whose absence would preclude complete relief between plaintiff
and defendant. Necessary parties shall be made either plaintiffs
or defendants. 21 When such a person is not joined, and jurisdiction over him cannot be obtained, the court may allow the
action to proceed if justice requires. In determining whether
to allow the action to proceed, CPLR 1001(b) directs the court
to consider: (1) whether plaintiff has another effective remedy if
the action is dismissed for non-joinder; (2) whether the defendant
or the person not joined will be prejudiced thereby; (3) whether
such prejudice might be avoided; (4) whether the court might
fashion a protective measure; and, (5) whether an effective judgment can be rendered in the party's absence.
Compulsory joinder is by no means a new development in
the law. CPLR 1001 did not change the law, but rather was
1953

Misc. 2d at 5, 277 N.Y.S2d at 804. While the court indicated

that the defendant, in fact, had received no notice of the pending action,
even if he had, due process would not be satisfied unless the mode of
service was reasonably calculated to give the defendant notice. See also
Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
2052 Misc. 2d 696, 276 N.Y.S2d 652 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1967).
21
For example, joint obligees and joint obligors are necessary parties,
but joint tort-feasors are not because they are jointly and severally liable.
2 WamsT=, Komr & Mnrm, Naw YoRK Cnar. PRAcrmcE 1001.06 (1965).
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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

intended to codify past practices in New York.2 2 The principal
difference between this section and its predecessor 23 is the omission
of the word "indispensable." Under the Civil Practice Act, an
indispensable party had to be joined or the action would be
dismissed.2 4 At the present time, if the questions listed in
CPLR 1001(b) cannot be answered favorably, the absent party
is "indispensable, '

25

so the action must be dismissed.

I-However,

it must not be forgotten that despite the codification of these
wide discretion in determining
factors, the court may still exercise
2
whether to dismiss the action.

6

27

In the Mechta case, the court found the wife to be a
necessary party as prejudice to both her and the defendant might
have accrued from the non-joinder, an effective judgment could
not be rendered in her absence, and, a protective measure could
not be fashioned by the court. She was, therefore, "indispensable,"
and the action was dismissed.
While it may have been impossible for the court to fashion a
substantive measure that would have protected the parties, it would
appear that instead of outright dismissal, an alternative would have
been some form of procedural device. For example, the court
might have dismissed on the condition that the defendant stipulate
to accept service in a jurisdiction where the wife could be joined.
With this device, the plaintiff would still have had a way of
determining his alleged right, and prejudice to all parties could
have been avoided.
CPLR 1005(a).: Limited partners allowed to bring class action
and derivative action.
CPLR 1005(a) provides that
[w]here the question is one of a common or general interest of many
persons or where the persons who might be made parties are very
1001.01
222 WEINSTEIN, KORN & Mn.sLER, NEw YORK CivIL PRAcricE
(1965); 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR 1001, commentary 219 (1963). But note,
however, that under the CPLR it is no longer necessary to make two
motions-one to join the absent party, and in the event of non-joinder,
another to dismiss. Now a single motion to dismiss under CPLR
3211 (a) (10) is all that is required. Blumenthal v. Allen, 46 Misc. 2d
688, 260 N.Y.S.2d 363 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965); The Biannual Survey
of New York Practice, 40 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 122, 144-45 (1965).
23 CPA § 193.
24 7B McKniN.v's CPLR 1001, supp. commentary 26 (1966).

Ibid.

25
26 2

WEINSTmN,

KORN

&

MILLER,

NEW

YoRx

CML PRACTICE

T 1001.08

A recent example is Provident Tradesnens Bank & Trust Co.
(1965).
v. Lumbermens Mit. Cas. Co., 365 F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1966). See 42 ST.
JonN's L. Rav. 108 (1967), wherein FED. R. Crv. P. 19, which is almost
identical to CPLR 1001, is explained and interpreted.
27 Mechta v. Scaretta, 52 Misc. 2d 696, 276 N.Y.S.2d 652 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1967).

